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I.

INTRODUCTION

In her article for this symposium, Professor Fineman challenges us
to reconceptualize support for the caretaking that occurs in the
family.' She argues that intrafamilial dependency is not a private
problem, as much of liberal theory assumes, but instead imposes a
public obligation. She proposes the development of "a theory of
* Catherine J. Ross, Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law
School; and Naomi R. Cahn,Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. The
authors appreciate the research support of Michelle Wu and the GWU Law School, and the
comments of Barbara Babb, Adrienne Davis, Mark Hardin, Jana Singer, Joan Williams, and the
Baltimore/Washington Feminist Law Professors Reading Group.
The order of the authors' names was decided using a coin toss.
1. Martha Albertson Fineman, Crackingthe FoundationalMyths: Independence,Autonomy, and
Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (2000).

2. For critiques of liberal theory, see generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER,
AND THE FAMILY (1989); EuZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIALWOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REA= OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991) (critiquing the unchallenged nature of the family in
law); MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALrIY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY POLITICS (1999); EVA
FEDER KrIAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS OF WOMEN, EQUALrY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999); JOAN C.
WILLIAMS, DEMONSTRATING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO

ABoUTIT.

(1999).
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collective responsibility for dependency," which would allow
caretakers autonomy and independence while providing them with
adequate resources to exercise this independence and autonomy.'
To articulate this theory, she challenges us not just to question
contemporary notions of dependency and fiscal subsidy, but also to
promote a national dialogue concerning our vision of support for
caretaking that would recognize its public nature.
In responding to Professor Fineman's challenge, this Article
explores one of the primary existing efforts to assume collective
responsibility for dependency. As we considered concrete responses
to Professor Fineman's broad theoretical construct, it struck us that
the major program that provides financial support for the caretakers
of children in the United States, without examining the earning
capacity of the caretaker, is the subsidized child welfare system.4 This
program selects and subsidizes "worthy" families in which to place
children from "unworthy" families. It is not a means-based program.'
The foster care system provides important information about the
viability of subsidies for caretakers of children in the United States.
Professor Fineman urges us to consider the "actual (as contrasted
with the assumed) family,"' reminding us that contemporary families
take many forms. Although she appears to focus on the diversity that
stems from individual choices in forming families, a significant
minority of families are created expressly by the state through the
foster care system, often without individual choice. These families
3. Fineman, supra note 1, at 16.
4. The term "child welfare system" encompasses the state's machinery for responding to
allegations of child abuse and neglect, including neglect attributable to lack of money or
housing, beginning with the initial report of suspected abuse and including any subsequent
state contact with the family such as services, removal from the home to temporary placement
in a foster family or institution, termination of parental rights, and placement of the child in an
adoptive or other permanent home. The public welfare system provides money to poor
children and, as discussed infra, it also subsidizes caretakers; this subsidy is available, however,
only after examining the caretaker's earning capacity.
In addition, a series of subsidies are imbedded in the tax system and other programs, but
these remain more passive. To the extent that these subsidies benefit higher income families,
they provide limited support for Professor Fineman's reconceptualization of subsidies for
caretaking. Professor Fineman's dystopian fantasy makes clear the enormous impact that these
deeply imbedded practices have on children. SeeFineman, supranote 1, at 26-28.
5. Foster care providers are not subjected to any means-testing, although the children for
whom they care must have been eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children as ofJune
1, 1995. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (4) (1998).
6. Fineman, supra note 1, at 14.
7. There are at least 500,000 children in foster care today. See EvAN B. DONALDSON,
ADOPT-ON INST., MEDIA RESOURCE GUIDE: ADOPTON ISSuES 2 (1998) (noting that the 500,000
children in foster care in 1996 represented a 79% increase over 1986 figures).
Even if Professor Fineman's proposal for subsidizing caretakers were to come into existence,
foster families would still exist to provide care for children who are under state supervision.
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form when the state removes children from their homes based on
allegations of abuse or neglect, or when parents relinquish
responsibility over their children to the state,8 and the state places the
children in the foster care system. These are also "actual" families,
and we believe they have much to tell us about possible relations
between the family and the state.
In this paper, we explore the assumptions underlying
contemporary foster care. We examine the significant legislation that
establishes the federalized nature of the foster care system to
determine the assumptions it reflects regarding the purposes of
subsidizing caretaking and the relative merits of different categories
of caretakers. Through these laws, we envision the issues that may
inform a national debate on whether and how to provide additional
public support for "private" caretaking. The foster care system shows
that public support for subsidizing families is strongest when it is
temporary and when it encourages families' compliance with social
norms. Moreover, support for the foster care system is conditioned
on children living outside of their families of origin so that society
has an assurance that it is not subsidizing adults who would otherwise
be accountable for the care of their own children.
1H.

THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM

In this section, we discuss the salient features of the foster care
system that must be examined in order to formulate a theory of
collective responsibility for dependency. Under contemporary law,
the federally-funded foster care system provides funding for the
caretaking of children whose parents are unable or unwilling to care
for them. Children enter foster care when the state removes them
based on abuse or neglect, or when parents voluntarily place their
children in the foster care system. 10 Foster care is supposed to be
8. Parents may relinquish a child either by an autonomous choice or by a coerced
"voluntary" act, such as when a public agency threatens a parent with court action unless she
signs a "voluntary" relinquishment. See generally William M. Schur & Joan Heifetz Hollinger,
Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship: Grounds for Termination, in ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4.0411] (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 1997) [hereinafter ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTIcE] (discussing the termination of the parent-child relationship).
9. Federal support for foster care began pursuant to the 1935 Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1994). See Mark Courtney, The Costs of ChildProtection in the Context of Welfare
Reform, 8 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 88, 90 (1998). The conceptual basis for federal foster care dates
at least to the 1909 White House Conference on Children. See Susan Vivian Mangold, Protection,
Privatization,and Profit in the FosterCare System, 60 OHIO ST. Lj. (forthcoming 1999). See infra
note 72 for further discussion.
10. See James B. Boskey & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Types of Placementfor Adoption: Foster
Parent Placements, in ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at § 3.02[2] (discussing
parents' relinquishment of responsibility over their children).
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temporaryI out-of-home care which generally occurs within a familial
setting. The federal government provides funding for foster care2
providers regardless of the providers' income from other sources.
Both the financial subsidy and the relationship officially terminate
when the child turns eighteen. If a family or individual adopts the
child, then the subsidy normally ends as well. 4 The express message
is that once a child becomes part of a "legal" family, caretaking
responsibilities become privatized. The transition between publicly
and privately subsidized caretaking that occurs when a child leaves or
enters the foster care system creates a tension that is part of Professor
Fineman's argument. This section provides a review of the history of
foster care in the United States and of the increasing federalization of
the foster care system.
Foster care has a long history. Traditionally, older children in
Western culture entered out-of-home placement through indenture
to learn a craft, work as a servant, or learn appropriate demeanor."
11. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 823
(1977) (acknowledging foster care as "[a] child welfare service which provides substitute family
care for a planned period[.j" (citations omitted)); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 961
(D.D.C. 1991) (noting the temporary nature of a child's removal from the family home).
12. This paper concerns federal funding for licensed foster care providers. See 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(10) (Supp. 1998) (requiring states to establish requirements for foster care home
eligibility). A series of informal arrangements also exist that function without the state legally
removing children from their families of origin. See, e.g., Note, The Policy of Penalty in Kinship
Care, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (1999). The Department of Health and Human Services
estimated that, in 1990, slightly more than two percent of all children lived in a relative's
household without a parent, but "only a small fraction" of the children lived in a formal foster
family. Adoption Promotion Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 41 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings]
(testimony of Olivia Golden, Admin. for Children & Families, United States Dep't of Health &
Human Servs.). In these informal arrangements, the relatives may receive special Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families [TANF] grants for the children. Moreover, states place some
foster children outside of licensed families in licensed child care institutions. See Mangold,
supranote 9.
13. See Challenges Confronting ChildrenAging Out ofFosterCare: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Human Resources ofthe House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Robin
Nixon, Dir. for Youth Servs., Child Welfare League of Am.), available at
<http://www.house.gov/waysmeans/humres/lO6cong/-9-99/3-9nixo.htm>. A few statesMaryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York-have begun to establish programs that will
enable foster care children over the age of 18 to receive services and financial support until age
21 for educational and transitional purposes. See id.
14. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (1994), a child's eligibility for foster care maintenance
payments continues for as long as the state has responsibility for her care. Once a family or
individual adopts her, of course, the state is no longer responsible for her care.
The situation is different for "special needs" children, whose adoptive parents are entitled to
some additional subsidy. See 42 U.S.C. § 673 (1994).
15. See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800 112
(1977) (relating that especially in lower and middle class families, children were viewed as an
economic burden and were consequently sent to live with other families in the hope that the
new family would provide a better life for them); EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY,
RELIGION AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NEW ENGLAND

77 (1966)
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In colonial Massachusetts, laws expressly empowered the Selectmen
to place poor children with families other than their own.'6 After
indenture ceased to be a normal part of growing up for children of
all social classes, placement in the presumptively worthy families of
non-relatives remained a dominant option for the care of
impoverished children. 17 For about one hundred years, beginning in
the mid-nineteenth century, philanthropic organizations or state and
local governments arranged such out-of-home placements.'8
The Social Security Act of 1935, which provided for Aid to
Dependant Children in their own homes, did not provide direct
subsidies for the care of children not living with family members or
close relatives. 9 Beginning in 1961, the federal government
authorized the use of federal funds to subsidize foster families under
the "Flemming Ruling."" The Flemming Ruling permitted states to
use federal funds to pay foster care providers for the care of children

(stating that often children were sent to live with their school teachers or families to learn
better manners);Janet L. Dolgin, Transforming Childhood,Apprenticeship in American Law, 31 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 1113, 1118 (1997) ("Most colonial parents apprenticed their children soon after
infancy ended.., to learn a trade and to be educated at least minimally in the home of a
master.").
16. See CHILDREN ANDYOLTH INAmI.cA: A DoCUMENTARYI-IISTORY: VOL 1,39 (Robert H.
Bremner et al. eds., 1970) (citing Mass. Records, II (1853), 8-9 (reprinting a law dated 1642));
see also id.at 40 (citing LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, REPRINTED FROM THE COPY OF
THE 1648 EDION (Max Farrand ed., 1929)).
17. See discussion in Catherine J. Ross, Families Without Paradigms, 60 OHIo ST. LJ.
(forthcoming 1999);JOSEPH F. KETT, rES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA, 1790 TO THE
PRESENT 148 (1977) (stating also that poor parents sent their children to work in the homes of
wealthy families in order to support themselves as well as their natural family).
18. SeeADOt'TION LAW AND PRAcrICE, supra note 8, at 1-20 - 1-29 (discussing the evolution
of adoption procedures from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century);
Catherine J. Ross, Society's Children: the Care of Indigent Youngsters in New York City, 18751903 (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with authors). This
tradition should be distinguished from the use of apprenticeship laws to extract unpaid labor
from African-American children in the post-Civil War South. See PEGGY COOPER DAvIS,
NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 147-49 (1997) (discussing how
certain state laws in the South gave local courts the authority to essentially re-enslave black
children under the guise of apprenticeship laws, usually returning the children to their former
masters).
19. H.R. 7260, § 406, 74th Cong. (1935) (enacted).
See infra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text; Naomi Cahn, Children'sInterests in a FamilialContext: Poverty, FosterCare and
Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. LJ.(forthcoming 1999).
20. The Flemming Ruling was issued by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
and adopted by the Congress in 1961. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 322-23 (1968)
(explaining the origins of the Flemming Ruling). The rule barred states from finding mothers
ineligible for aid based on their marital status at the time of the child's birth, and provided that
if the home was "suitable," it should receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC]
payments. If a home was "unsuitable," then the state would remove the child and place her in
foster care, where she would remain eligible for Aid to Dependent Children. Id. (quoting
Secretary Fleming's statement that "[a]ssistance will therefore be continued during the time
efforts are being made either to improve the home conditions or to make arrangements for the
child elsewhere").
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who would otherwise have been eligible for public welfare had they
remained in their parents' homes." Over the past twenty years,
Congress has enacted two major pieces of legislation that have firmly
established federal oversight of the foster care system.
A. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
Federal financial and regulatory involvement in state-run foster
care systems expanded in 1980 with the passage of the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA).2
The AACWA
attempted to federalize state foster care programs to some extent by
establishing comprehensive standards for foster care systems.' It also
regularized federal reimbursements for state-approved foster care.
For purposes of comparison to Professor Fineman's proposal in
this symposium, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the AACWA is
the debate over the definition of the purpose of "Foster Care
Maintenance Payments. " 25 In 1980, the AACWA added the definition
of such payments that remains in effect today. 6 The Act defined
foster care maintenance payments to foster parents as "payments to
cover the cost of (and cost of providing) food, clothing, shelter, daily
supervision,
school supplies,
[and]
a child's
personal
incidentals ....
Controversy arose over language drafted by the
Senate, which included payments to cover the cost of "daily
supervision."28 Although the House of Representatives ultimately
agreed to the Senate language, it did so with reservations,
underscoring that "payments for the costs of providing care to foster
children are not intended to include reimbursements in the nature
of a salary for the exercise by the foster family parent of ordinary
parental duties. " '
21. See id. at 326 n.23.
22. Adoption Assistance and Child welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679 (1988)).
23. See Roger J.R Levesque, 7w Failures of Foster Care Reform: Revolutionalizing the Most
Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 1, 14 (1995) (stating that the federal

government expressed its commitment to alleviating problems with state foster care programs
by providing federal financial assistance). See 42 U.S.C. § 670 (Supp. IV 1992).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 96-336, at 12 (1979). The act eliminates the old federal
reimbursements that ranged from one-third to two-thirds of the cost of foster care, and
substituting a flat reimbursement rate of 75%.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 675(4) (A) (1998).
26. See id. (recognizing that this act is current through Pub. L. No. 106-20, approved Apr.
9, 1999).
27. Id.

28. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-900, at 48-50 (1980). The act amends and strengthens the
Social Security Act programs for state child welfare and social programs.
29. Id. at 49-50.
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This debate over reimbursement for time spent on "daily
supervision," the most arduous and the most rewarding part of
parenting, suggests that members of the House of Representatives
shared the popular assumption that parenting-even foster
parenting-should be primarily an act of altruism. The Senate,
however, may have implicitly shared some of Professor Fineman's
recognition that "caretaking" requires financial resources, whether
regarded as pay for services rendered or as subsidy to make the family
system succeed."0
B. Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct
In 1997, Congress again enacted major legislation, the Adoption
and Safe Families Ace' (ASFA), which confirmed federal government
The primary purpose of ASFA was to
control over foster care.
increase the number of children adopted from the foster care system;
indeed, legislators named the bill the "Adoption Promotion Act"
when it passed the House of Representatives." ASFA emphasizes the
temporary nature of foster care. Nonetheless, it also recognizes that
foster parents have some knowledge and understanding of the
children for whom they care and, thus, although not entitled to any
additional substantive rights, are at least entitled to additional
procedural rights than they received under previous legislation.34
The legislation provides that the state must give foster parents notice
of, and an opportunity to be heard at, any reviews and permanency
hearings.35 Prior to ASFA, states often denied foster parents access to
such proceedings.
During the hearings, foster parents testified about their lack of
access to court processes concerning their children. 7 The Children's
Defense Fund testified in support of providing notice and an
opportunity for foster care parents to participate at hearings that
30. See id. (noting that the Senate bill would convert the child welfare program to an
"advance funding basis").
31. 42 U.S.G. § 671 (1989).
32. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997). See also HHS Proposes Regulation:Adoption and
Safe FamiliesAct (visitedJuly 22, 1999) <http://vvw.casanet.org/news/legislative/hhs-9-98.htm>
(explaining that the proposed regulation focuses on the results these programs achieve, rather
than procedural reviews as in the past).
33. SeeH.R. REP. No. 105-77 (1997).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(F).
35. SeeH.R. REP. No. 105-77 (1997).
36. See id.
37. See Bill Grimm, Adoption and Safe Families Act Brings Big Changes in Child Welfare, 18
YouTH L. NEWS 1, 5 (1997) (discussing how AFSA represents a comprehensive overhaul of the
federal welfare system).
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review the status of their children, explaining the importance of "the
involvement of caretakers at the review hearings."" In addition, the
United States Department of Health and Human Services affirmed
that foster care parents, "[als the primary caregivers of children in
out-of-home care.., have valuable firsthand knowledge that can help
inform decisions .... ,9 Congressional legislation recognizes foster
parents as key participants in the system, albeit with extremely limited

claims.
III. PROFESSOR FINEMAN'S PROPOSAL AND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
The foster care system is particularly well-suited to our examination

of Professor Fineman's proposal because it differs in critical respects
from other forms of public subsidy, such as Social Security and
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) , which replaced
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 41 First, although

the foster care system remains similar to TANF in that it provides
subsidy to the caretaking unit, it does so with relatively little
interference into the caretaker's life; once a foster family is licensed,
the activities of its individual members are not monitored, and
"intervention" occurs only with respect to the child. Second, although
it shares characteristics of other transfer programs such as Social
Security or worker's compensation, it differs because the whole
program is expressly earmarked for the expenses associated with

caretaling of children.
A.

The Welfare Contrast

Congress designed TANF to provide temporary support for
children of poor families.42 Like the earliest public welfare programs,
38. Hearings,supra note 12, at 90 (testimony of Marylee Allen, Children's Defense Fund)
(emphasis added). See also Heaings, supranote 12, at 16 (testimony of Senator Mike DeWine)
("[I]t is right that these foster parents be heard. To exclude the foster parents from the court
proceedings may mean silencing the child's most forceful and most informed advocates.").
39. Heaings, supra note 12, at 41 (testimony of Olivia Golden) (acknowledging the
inherent tensions in the foster care arrangement, and expressing concern that such
involvement might give foster parents rights that were inconsistent with their status as
"temporary" caretakers).
40. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (establishing TANF as the replacement for AFDC and
explaining that a state can opt in to the Act only if it had previously operated under AFDC).
41. See id. (establishing new state reporting and data requirements for the TANF program);
see also Administration for Children and Families, Facisheet-Wefare-TemporaryAssistancefor Needy
Families (TANF) (visited Jun. 30, 1999) <http://vAvw.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/opa/facts/
tanf.htm> (reporting the signing of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 by President Clinton on Aug. 22, 1996).
42. See LINDA GORDON, PI=ED BuT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994); Naomi R. Cahn, RepraentingRace Outside of Explicitly Racialized
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TANF screens "worthy" families for support.4 Historically, the initial
and ongoing screening processes for government subsidy recipients
have involved a high level of scrutiny for recipients. This began with
attempts to provide support for the children of "morally worthy"
widows, which first received national attention at a 1909 White House
Conference on Children." Illinois enacted a Mother's Aid Law in
1911, which limited eligibility to widowed mothers who were
American citizens." Thirty-nine states had enacted similar legislation
by 1919.46 Not only did large percentages of potentially eligible
mothers not receive aid, but also the amount received was generally
insufficient to allow the women to stay at home as full-time mothers.
Due to the morality standards written into such laws, large categories
of women did not receive aid.8 Only three of the laws allowed
unmarried mothers to receive pensions, and, in a 1931 study, the
U.S. Children's Bureau found that ninety-six percent of the recipients
0 After the enactment
were white, and only three percent were black.Y
of Aid to Dependent Children in 1935, morality requirements
continued
to
exclude blacks;5
"man-in-the-house"
rules"
Contexts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 965, 965-66 (1997) (arguing that people must challenge the gender
and racial perceptions in welfare reform cases by exposing the stereotypes that inform welfare
regulations).
43. See id. (discussing additional requirements).
44. See BarbaraJ. Nelson, The Orginsof the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen's Compensation
and Mother's Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 123, 138 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990)
(discussing the development of federal and state support to the children of worthy widows).
45. See id.(explaining that initially Social Security contained no provision for the coverage
of wives or widows); see also TnEDA SKOcpOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 424-79 (1992) (discussing the
history and adoption of mothers' pension laws). The 1911 Missouri law on mothers' pensions
allowed pensions to widows who were "in the judgement of the Juvenile Court... a proper
person, morally, physically, and mentally, for the bringing up of her children." Id. See generally
MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF POOR WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 318-23 (1988) (discussing the history of mothers' pension
laws).
46. See Nelson, supra note 44, at 139 (explaining the increase in state adoption); SKOCPOL,
supra note 42, at 446-47 (citing a chart with date of state enactments).
47. See SKOCPOL, supranote 45, at 471 (explaining that this was the case despite the fact
that the pension was designed to honor those that provided service to the state).
48. See SKOCPOL, supranote 45, at 471 (stating that the role of women was mothering, not
civil service).
49. See SKOCPOL, supra note 45, at 467 (noting that initially social insurance excluded
mothers altogether).
50. See Nelson, supra note 44, at 139 (noting that southern states were the least likely to
have military service pensions and usually paid less money for them).
51. See generally GORDON, supra note 42 ("The superior programs are disproportionately
white and male and they were designed to be so, because that was the dominant image of
citizenship in 1935."); Dorothy Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE LJ.
1563 (1996) (reviewing GORDON, supra note 42).
52. See Kingv. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,334 (1968) (striking down man-in-the-house rules).
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simultaneously discouraged the formation of two-parent families
while policing the behavior of single women.53
As an example of the ongoing scrutiny of welfare recipients,
consider the 1969 case of Wyman v. James."' At the time, New York
state law required home visits to public welfare recipients once every
three months;5 the visits were intended to verify information
concerning eligibility for welfare, provide professional counseling,
and prevent welfare fraud. 6 Moreover, New York law specified that a
child would only be eligible for aid "if his home situation is one in
which his physical, mental and moral well-being will be safeguarded
and his religious faith preserved and protected." 7 Barbara James, a
public welfare recipient, refused to allow her caseworker to visit her
home.58 She told her caseworker that she would provide any
information that was relevant to her continued receipt of welfare, but
that the caseworker could not make a home visit.5 ' The Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the home visits.60 In dissent, Justices
Marshall and Brennan explained:
[I] t is argued that the home visit is justified to protect dependent
children from 'abuse' and 'exploitation.'
These are heinous
crimes, but they are not confined to indigent households. Would
the majority sanction, in the absence of probable cause,
compulsory visits to all61 American homes for the purpose of

discovering child abuse?

The history of aid to poor women is replete with attempts to
control their lives by conditioning the receipt of public welfare on
53. See Cahn, supra note 42, at 972 (arguing that aid to poor women was an attempt to
coerce women to conform to morality requirements).
54. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). This discussion is drawn from Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family
Privacy, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).

55. Id. at 312 n.4 (explaining that contacts shall include home visits, office interviews,
correspondence, reports on resources, and other forms of documentation).
56. Id. (explaining the desire of public welfare officials to provide assistance only so long as
it is necessary).
57. Id. This requirement was to assure that the welfare recipient conformed to the
standards of the community. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 369.2(d) (1) (McKinney
1992) (requiring that the home "be judged by the same standards as are applied to selfmaintaining families in the community").
58. James, 400 U.S. at 310. Upon James' refusal, the AFDC program threatened to
terminate her assistance.
59. Id. at 313 (explaining thatJames telephoned the worker ahead of time and asked the
worker not to come to her house).
60. See id. (remanding the case with direction to enter ajudgement of dismissal).
61. Id. at 341-42. Katharine Baker notes that "[tlhe justification for affording single
mothers less protection-i.e., that their individual claims to privacy are diminished by their
dependence on the state-cannot withstand scrutiny." Katharine Baker, Taking Care of Our
Daughters,18 CARDOzO L. REv. 1495, 1504 (1997) (book review).
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their compliance with morality requirements. 62 Under TANF, the
most visible form of such control is the requirement that a custodial
parent relinquish her 3 rights to receive child support from the noncustodial parent, assigning all such rights to the state.' Generally, at
her initial interview with a caseworker, the potential recipient signs a
simple form in which she agrees that the state is entitled to collect
her child support.65 To help the state collect the support, the
custodial parent must also agree to cooperate with the local child
support agency in establishing the identity of the father and in
obtaining the child support payments.H Federal regulations require
that states define "cooperation" to include actions ranging from
providing information at an interview at the local child support office
to testifying at child support hearings.6 7
In contrast, states initially screen foster families for certification
that they meet reasonable expectations for caretaking. Still, until
1997, the federal government did not even require that such
screening include background checks for criminal convictions.'e
Furthermore, once they are licensed, foster parents are subject to
little day-to-day intervention, except with respect to their direct
interactions with the child.6 9 Professor Fineman's proposal
emphasizes that a foster mother can choose to work or not to work
and will still receive her subsidy. In contrast, a TANF mother must
work, and her application for assistance ultimately relinquishes her
freedom of choice regarding her time, her family's zone of privacy,
and her financial autonomy.
62. This was true, regardless of the type of "aid" these mothers received. See LINDA
GORDON, HEROES OFTHEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORYOF FAMILY VIOLENCE 280-85
(1988) (discussing attempts to impose middle-class norms on poor women who were victims of
domestic abuse).
63. Virtually all of the custodial parents on AFDC are women. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MOTHERS WHO REcEIVE AFDC PAYMENTS (1998).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (26) (A) (1997).
65. See Cahn, supra note 42, at 973 (noting that the custodial parent must also agree to
cooperate).
66. 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(a) & (b) (1995) (securing the cooperation of custodial parents by
requiring, interalla, their appearance at state or local agency offices to provide information or
documentary evidence about the applicant). See also 54 Fed. Reg. 6237 (1999).
67. 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(b) (1995); see also Cahn, supra note 42, at 973 (explaining that
federal regulations provide various means for obtaining cooperation).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a). See Grimm, supranote 37, at 5 (discussing new requirements under
AFSA).
69. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)
(discussing the parameters of foster parents' rights). Unlike those in other families, however,
children can be removed from foster care with very little process. Id. ASFA, as discussed supra
notes 34-36 and accompanying text, provides a few more protections for foster parents.
70. The recipient must identify the putative father and cooperate with child support
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At the furthest extreme, let us imagine a neurosurgeon mother. If
she marries a similarly situated man, they may decide that he should
subsidize her role as caretaker for the family unit. Their decision
remains "private," and their financial choices are not subject to any
scrutiny.7 If,
however, she is a single mother who relies on her own
salary, but wishes to caretake as full-time work for a period of time,
our current public welfare system deprives her of that choice by
requiring her to earn what she is capable of earning. She cannot
"choose" to perform full-time home-work for any period of time. If
she is a foster mother, rather than a biological or adoptive mother,
who chooses to stay home, she will receive some subsidy for her
caretaking without any comparable work requirement. Moreover,
the foster care subsidy will be greater than what she would receive
under TANF.7 2
The distinctions between TANF and the federal foster care system
are demonstrated both financially and with respect to the relative
autonomy of the foster care parent compared to the TANF parent.7,
The disparities in the treatment of TANF recipients and foster
parents result from two underlying assumptions. First, the foster care
system expressly recognizes the contribution of caretakers to raising
children. Notwithstanding the original ambivalence toward such
subsidy in the 1961 legislation, foster parents receive public money to
raise children in their homes.
Second, the disparity reflects our incentives.
We want to
establishment and enforcement efforts.
71. For discussion of the factors leading up to these "choices," see RHONA MAHONEY,
KIDDING OURSELVES: BABIEs, BREADWINNNG, AND BARGAINING POWER 9-27 (1995) (discussing

the sexual division of labor and factors involved in this, including disparate education and
wages, domestic violence, the drastically lower standard of living for women upon divorce, "the
beauty problem," and how these factors affect children); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER
(1999); Naomi Cahn, The Powers of Caretaking 45 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999). For
discussion of the public subsidies for these private choices, see Fineman, supra note 1.
72. See Jill Duerr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain at Home: Foster Family Care and
Kinship Care, 8 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 72, 74-76 (1998). As Mark Courtney notes:

In 1993, the median monthlyAFDC payment for one child ($212) was more than $100
per month less than the median foster home maintenance payment ....
Furthermore, foster care rates are proportional to the number of children placed (two
children generate twice the foster care rate of one child), while AFDC per capita
payment rates decreased with increased family size. Thus, the more children in a
family, the greater is the difference in cost between public assistance and foster care.
Courtney, supra note 9, at 93. For example, some states have chosen to provide no additional
per capita payments under TANF when a recipient mother gives birth to another child.
73. As Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse points out, "[t]he tensions between our
ideals of community and our legacy of rugged individualism and reliance on private
responsibility, compounded by economic crisis, have been played out in cases and policies
surrounding the state's responsibility to children in foster care." Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Childrens Rights: The Destructionand Promise ofFamily, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 497, 506-07.
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encourage foster care by morally worthy families, but to discourage
biological or adoptive families from depending on public welfare.
We condition support for the foster care system on the notion that
children are living outside of their families of origin, thus providing
an assurance that the public is not subsidizing adults who would
otherwise be privately responsible for the care of their children. It is
reciprocally conditioned on the notion that children receiving public
support through the foster care system would otherwise live with bad
parents. In short, we want to privatize caretaking, except where the
private caretaker is deemed inadequate or unwilling to provide care
and a public caretaker is therefore substituted.
The judgments become more complex when the foster caregiver is
related to the child. 74 Some states relax licensing requirements for
kinship foster care;7' and, sometimes, when the kinship care provider
is not licensed, she may still receive TANF payments for the children
who live in her home. 76 An exception even exists to the temporary
Under these limited
nature of TANF for kinship providers."
circumstances, then, federal law provides grudging support even to
relatives, but only so long as they are not the biological parents. 78 For
Professor Fineman, the critical task is to convince Americans that all
parents may well need and deserve long-term support for caretaking.
B. Foster Care Compared with Other TransferPayments
Foster care shares a superficial similarity with other public
74. States frequently attempt to pay kinship providers less than non-relative foster parents.
Indeed, although Congress enacted the federal foster care legislation in 1960, only in 1979 did
the Supreme Court hold that the legislation required states to reimburse kinship providers at
the same rate as non-kinship providers. SeeMiller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 146 (1979). On the
other hand, if a state operates a separatel)-funded foster care system in addition to participating
in the federal program, the state may constitutionally deny support to relative caregivers.
Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (declaring that a state's
chosen statutory scheme in the area of economics and social welfare does not rise to the level of
heightened scrutiny, nor does it create a suspect class that violates 14th Amendment equal
protection).
75. See Berrick, supra note 72, at 75-76 (comparing AFDC financial assistance allocated for
non-kin and kin foster care children in four states).
76. See The Policy of Penalty in Kinship Care, supra note 12, at 1050 (discussing TANF
benefits). Kinship care providers may fail to qualify for foster care licensing because of the time
involved between applying for licensing and the actual issuance of the license. Interview with
Mark Hardin, ABA (Apr. 28, 1999).
77. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3)(e)(i), 111
Stat. 2115, 2118 (1997) (asserting that kinship foster parents approved by the state may
continue to receive subsidies until the child moves out of the foster care system).
78. States may thus circumvent Miller v. Youakim by not labeling a kinship placement as
foster care, but referring to it instead as care by a relative entitled to receive the child's public
welfare benefits (i.e., TANF). The latter group of relative providers thus receives a lower level
of benefits, even when fulfilling obligations equivalent to those of foster parents.
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subsidies, such as social security, workers' compensation, or
unemployment insurance. Foster care, like these other programs,
involves no scrutiny of the recipient beyond whether the recipient
satisfies certain concrete conditions. In other words, the state does
not inquire into recipients' private lives beyond the circumstances
prompting the relief (e.g., being fired); nor does the state place any
requirements on recipients to comply with social norms.
Closer examination, however, reveals that foster care differs
substantially from these other forms of public welfare. First, other
programs do not provide explicit support for caretaking that occurs
in the family. They are simply available under certain circumstances
(such as age or accidents or termination of employment). Second,
many programs other than foster care are true entitlements that do
not differentiate among the eligible based on their assets.
Alternatively, some programs provide public benefits only upon the
occurrence of some crisis.79 Such entitlements, unlike the foster care
system, are viewed generally as insurance programs for which the
recipient has "paid." Indeed, Professor Theda Skocpol traces the
development of the distinction between those who receive
"contributory insurance" and those who receive "noncontributory
public assistance," including public welfare.
Nonetheless, she
explains, the distinction remains illusory. For example, many women
who never worked outside of the home have received social security
benefits based on their husbands' contributions."' Similarly, social
security participants today, who believe that they are receiving only
what is due to them based on their contributions as workers, actually
receive between two and five times what they paid into the system."s
IV. LESSONS AND CHALLENGES FROM FOSTER CARE

What Professor Fineman proposes-public support for private
caretaking-is truly radical. In the United States, public opinion
remains highly ambivalent, at best, about whether to subsidize private
caretaking.
The foster care program, which provides limited
79. See Michele Landis, "LetMe Next Time Be 'Tied by Fire"':DisasterReliefand the Origins ofthe

American Welfare State 1789-1894, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 967, 971 (1998) (arguing that it was the
ability of claimants to depict themselves as "the morally blameless victims of a sudden
catastrophe-a disaster-that has largely determined the success or failure of a given claim").
80. See SKOCpOL, supranote 45.
81. Matthew Miller, It's Christmas: Let's Means-Test!, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 1996, at 28
(discussing social security and means-testing).
82. The national debate over the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§
2601-2654 (Supp. 1998), provides another illustration of the difficulties in supporting parents.
See generally Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 77 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
1999); Maxine Eichner, Square Pegin a Round Hole: ParentingPolicies and Liberal Theoy, 59 OHIO
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support for poor children in care outside of their family of origin, is
clearly a flawed model: it is temporary and provides inadequate
support. On the other hand, in its effort to subsidize caring for
children, it provides some precedent for Professor Fineman's theory.
At its heart, the foster care program contains a recognition that
children need caretakers, and that those caretakers, under certain
conditions, deserve support from the state. Moreover, the similarity
of the foster care program to various entitlement programs-through
its comparative lack of scrutiny of the caretaker recipients-offers
some promise for subsidizing caretakers while protecting their rights
of privacy.
The foster care program offers a much more constrained vision of
support for dependency than does Professor Fineman's proposal in at
least two ways. First, the foster care system is not designed to provide
long-term support, and it only provides support for children who live
outside of their families of origin. Professor Fineman, however, seeks
support for precisely such long-term caretaking within the family of
origin. Society does not approve of adults who perform caretaking in
order to be paid, as shown by the negative publicity given to foster
mothers whose foster care payments support them. 3 Of course,
Professor Fineman would argue that her proposed caretaker support
would not "pay" parents, but merely enable them to devote more
time to the caretaking function.
As a general matter, however, public support for subsidizing
families is strongest when programs encourage families to "behave
according to generally-accepted norms, in particular the norm of
working and making efforts toward self-sufficiency."8 4 Foster care,
arguably, fits in because the supposedly temporary nature of foster
families leads to an illusion that they help children from the families
FMIA protections are too narrow); Susan Deller
Ross, The Legal Aspects of ParentalLeave: At the Crossroads,in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE:
SETTING A RESEARCH AND POLICYAGENDA 98, 103-6 (Janet Shibley Hyde & MarilynJ. Essex eds.,
1991) (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the FMLA as states apply it).
In contrast, throughout the industrialized nations of Europe, social policy requires lengthy
paid maternity leaves and ongoing services for children. See SHEILA B. KAMERMAN & ALFRED J.
ST. LJ. 133, 148-50 (1998) (arguing that the

KAHN, FAMILY POLICY: GOVERNMENT AND FAMILIES

IN FOURTEEN COUNTRIES 17 (1978)

(analyzing the "explicit and comprehensive family policy" in European countries); MARY ANN
GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE LAW AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND WESTERN EUROPE 85 (1989) (addressing the various legal images of family relationships in

Europe that are lacking in the United States).
83. There is an enormous amount of skepticism about the genuineness of foster parents in
providing care for the "right" reasons. See, eg., Heather MacDonald, Foster Care's Underworld 9
CIYJ. 42 (1999) (claiming that kinship foster care "allows families to accommodate, and even
profit from, their dysfunctions").
84. Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and Bureaucrats:A Prehistoryof Welfare Reform, 14J.L.
& POL 225, 261 (1998).
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of origin move toward self-sufficiency-either through a return to
their families, or through adoption-and out of the child welfare
system.
Likewise, TANF, which transformed the underlying
assumptions of aid to poor families, attempts to enforce compliance
with public norms when poor families deserve support. TANF, which
temporarily supports the family unit, is premised on the notion that
the grant provides a transition to independence and that the
caretaker will assume complete financial responsibility within a short
period of time. 5 TANF also closely scrutinizes the behavior of the
recipient caretaker; if she has any substance abuse problems, for
example, the state may terminate her grant.
Moreover, even under foster care, we, as a society, will only help
poor children. Interesting and unchallenged assumptions lie behind
the federalization of foster care. We assume that wealthier parents
will support their children without federal help; and that their
children do not need-and consequently are ineligible to receivefederal foster care or subsidies, regardless of the treatment they
receive at the hands of their parents. 6 After all, an express reason for
state subsidized foster care is to remove children who suffer abuse or
neglect. We had initially assumed, therefore, before doing research
for this article, that the child's entitlement to public funds would not
depend on the parents' financial status. In reality, however, federally
funded foster care is only available for children whose family of
origin would be qualified pursuant to 1995 standards governing
AFDC eligibility. This reality raises some troubling points that
Professor Fineman will need to address in promoting the dialogue
that she wishes to encourage. It stands as a stark reminder that even
where the state intends the subsidy solely for the protection of the
innocent child, and not for the caretaker whose vision of
responsibility may differ from social norms, the United States has
proved reluctant to provide any benefits for the children of parents
who have the financial capacity to support them, even if they lack the
emotional capacity.
Second, both the foster care system and TANF are premised on
providing support for the child, in whatever familial unit she currently
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(1)(A)(ii) (1997) (imposing a maximum number of months that
welfare recipients may collect TANF payments before seeking employment). See also Eugene J.
Grigsby III, Welfare Reform Means Business as Usual 64 J. AMl. PLANNING ASS'N 19 (1998)
(suggesting the desire to break the "cycle of dependency" as the impetus behind the TANF
legislation).
86. State foster care programs may provide different arrangements. See The Policy of Penalty
in Kinship Care, supra note 12, at 1050-52 (arguing that states use many mechanisms in
supporting needy, abused, and neglected children, including state funded programs that
deviate from federal AFDC-FC eligibility requirements).
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lives. Professor Fineman seeks support for the caretaking unit, not
just the child. The willingness to support the individual child reflects
much broader social, legal, and philosophical notions about the role
of the child as the future deserving citizen of the state. 7 In order to
convince policymakers to accept her proposal, Professor Fineman will
need to address explicitly the reasons that the unit, as opposed to the
child, is sufficiently important to the social good to deserve the
independence and subsidy that Professor Fineman envisions.88
By providing her alternative vision of how to support caretakers,
Professor Fineman dramatically illustrates the class- and gender-based
nature of our current system of caretaking, under which women who
do not depend on public support provide caretaking without
intervention and explicit subsidy.89 Her proposal requires us to ask
why only affluent women should be allowed to entertain the option of
spending the majority of their time with their children. It also leads
us to question our priorities for children, such as why only certain
children deserve the uninterrupted attention of a parent, and,
whether such attention truly serves the child's best interests.
And, not for the first time, she causes us to challenge the rhetoric
surrounding the centrality of families to our social organization.
Although we are not sanguine about the possibility of the national
dialogue on the family that Professor Fineman recommends; we
agree that such a dialogue could lead to more constructive visions
about various family-related issues." Critical engagement with the
dilemmas of developing a thoughtful policy that protects children
and their caretakers can only move our culture closer to the goal of
valuing families.

87. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (discussing the role of parents
and the state in guarding the welfare of children); VIVIANA ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS
CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 208-28 (1985) (discussing the historically
shifting approach of the United States toward children as economically productive members of
the family unit); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AERICAN LAw 267-311 (1990) (discussing legal perceptions of children as rights-based and in a
relational context).
88. We understand that the article in this symposium is excerpted from a much larger
book, and we assume that the larger book will address such an important issue. See, e.g., Martha
Fineman, What Plaefor Family Privacy?, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999) (arguing
that subsidy to the caretaking unit preserves its autonomy and privacy).
89. Id. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 51 (1997) (analyzing women's role as a caretaker of home and family).
90. We remain, however, wary of such a dialogue lest it be dominated by powerful and
unrepresentative voices. For example, the contemporary debate on morality in family law is
multi-faceted, but conservative theorists such as David Blankenhorn and current presidential
hopeful Gary Bauer seem to be receiving disproportionate attention.

